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ABSTRACT
Nationalist and regionalist geopolitical concepts were appropriated in the ser-
vice of Communist world revolution by Finnish activists in Sweden, Finland, 
and Soviet Karelia. The influence of Social Democratic statesman and scholar 
of geopolitics, Väinö Voionmaa, can be traced in the negotiations that led to 
the foundation of an autonomous Karelian Labour Commune in 1921. Exiled 
Finnish revolutionaries persuaded the Bolsheviks that Karelia could become a 
stepping-stone towards revolution in Finland and Scandinavia. A greater So-
cialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia, united by cultural, geographical and eco-
nomical factors, would monopolize the timber market and exercise economic 
power over Western Europe. The idea of a Scandinavian revolution was aban-
doned along with the idea of world revolution in the mid-1920s. The last men-
tions of a Soviet Scandinavia can be found in anti-Soviet propaganda long after 
the demise of its promoters in the Great Terror.
Keywords: geopolitics, revolution, regionalism, nationalism, Scandinavia, So-
viet Union, Karelian Labour Commune
The pursuit of a “Greater Finland” is a well-known chapter in the history 
of Finnish nationalism. The Greater Finland project uniting the “tribal 
brothers” of Finland and Karelia, sometimes also the national irredenta 
of the border regions in Northern Sweden and Norway, the Kola Penin-
sula and the Finno-Ugric minorities of Russia, was practically monopo-
lized by right-wing intellectual movements after Finland’s independence 
in 1917 and the subsequent civil war.1 However, it had inspired politicians 
and scholars identifying as Socialist before, and it would continue to do so. 
Another geopolitical project could be argued to be an extension of “Greater 
Finland” – the unification of “Scandinavia” (in practice, Sweden and Nor-
way) with Finland and Karelia in the service of world revolution. I follow 
the trail of this “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia” from its obscure 
1  Maria Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa – puolue- ja geopoliitikko (Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
kirjallisuuden seura, 2014), 113. Cf. Luvattu maa – Suur-Suomen unelma ja unohdus, ed. 
by Jenni Kirves and Sari Näre (Helsinki: Johnny Kniga – WSOY, 2014). 
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beginnings among the exiled leadership of the failed Finnish revolution of 
1918, to its use in the debates on the foundation of an autonomous Soviet 
Karelia in the early 1920s, until its promoters were destroyed in the Great 
Terror 1936–38. The “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia” made its 
final appearances in anti-Soviet propaganda in the 1940s.
Arguably, a “Red Greater Finland” had been promoted by the short-
lived revolutionary government of Finland, the Finnish People’s Delega-
tion, as well as Finnish Communists in Soviet Karelia, wishing to expand 
the borders of 1917.2 On the Social Democratic side, statesman and histo-
rian Väinö Voionmaa articulated a pre-independence geopolitical vision 
of a Greater Finland including the Kola Peninsula and Russian Karelia.3 
Scandinavianist or Nordicist tendencies in left-wing Finnish nationalism 
have been studied to a lesser extent. Scholars of regional identities have 
noted that the “Nordic” and the national are historically entangled con-
cepts, possibly to a higher degree than the more specific “Scandinavian.”4 
Progressives in all the Nordic countries have at times used the strategy of 
presenting ideas as Nordic or Scandinavian to make them palatable to a 
conservative audience.5 Being “Nordic” or “Scandinavian” is a way of being 
“national” outside the constraints of conservative nationalism. These asso-
ciations have also been evoked in response to external threats. Inversely, 
the “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia” was abandoned as fears of 
external threats to the Soviet state intensified. 
From Karelia, via Greater Finland, to Scandinavia
Karelia is a cultural-geographical region divided by the state border between 
Finland and Russia. In the south-west, it is framed by the Gulf of Finland 
and Lake Saimaa. In the south, the borders are considered to be the south-
ern shore of Lake Ladoga and the River Svir, and in the north-east, the 
White Sea south of the Kola Peninsula. Geologically, Karelia belongs to 
2  Tuomas Tepora, “Heimoveljiä, valkobandiitteja ja punikin perkeleitä – valkoisen ja 
punaisen Suur-Suomen aate- ja tunnehistoriaa ennen toista maailmansotaa,” Luvattu 
maa – Suur-Suomen unelma ja unohdus, ed. by Jenni Kirves and Sari Näre (Helsinki: 
Johnny Kniga – WSOY, 2014), 113–123.
3  Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 105–106.
4  Jussi Kurunmäki, “‘Nordic democracy’ in 1935,” Rhetorics of Nordic democracy, ed. 
by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2011), 75.
5  Such as the aforementioned “Nordic democracy,” cf. Kurunmäki, “‘Nordic democracy’ 
in 1935,” 77. See also Jan Hecker-Stampehl, “Keeping up the morale – constructions of 
‘Nordic democracy’ during World War II,” Rhetorics of Nordic democracy, ed. by Jussi 
Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2011), 141ff.
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the “old Fennoscandian bedrock region,” and its conifer forests connect it 
to the vast taiga belt of Northern Eurasia. Beyond Lake Onega in the east, 
the landscape starts to resemble “the typical plains landscape of Eastern 
Europe,” which may indicate that it is easier to draw Karelia’s eastern bor-
der than its western one.6 However, it is possible to speak of several “Kare-
lias” and define them each according to different historical and geographi-
cal preconditions.7 The numerous interlaced lakes in Eastern Finland and 
Western Karelia have connected people, rather than separated them. The 
border region was an old battleground of the Kingdom of Sweden and first 
Novgorod, then Muscovy, but also an important trade route. Christian-
ity was spread from both east and west and came to define nationality in 
the Early Modern era. Orthodox Karelians nicknamed Lutherans ruotši, 
Swedes.8 The area referred to as “East Karelia” (Itä-Karjala) or “Far Karelia” 
(Kauko-Karjala) had remained beyond the reach of the Swedish Kingdom, 
but attracted the interest of Finnish scholars exploring the Finno-Ugric 
linguistic family tree in the nineteenth century. The Karelian language 
consisted of several dialects of a varying degree of closeness to Finnish, 
which itself was not standardized until the 1860s.9 
A culturally as well as geographically defined Karelia was central to 
every vision of a Finnish nation, despite its peripheral position. A whole 
branch of scholarship and art, Karelianism, was dedicated to it. Folklorists 
in the early decades of the nineteenth century such as Elias Lönnrot trav-
elled through Finland and ventured beyond the country’s historical borders 
in their quest for authentic and primordial Finnish customs.10 Although 
Karelia as a region had interested Finnish scholars since the late Enlight-
enment, in the second half of the nineteenth century it became something 
more than a memorial to a golden past, namely a possible future source of 
national development. Väinö Voionmaa wanted to move on from museal 
6  Petri J. Raivo, “Karjalan kasvot: näkökulmia Karjalan maisemaan,” Karjala: historia, 
kansa, kulttuuri, ed. by Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo (Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1998), 12.
7  Pirjo Uino, “Karjalan arkeologian suuntaviivoja,” Karjala: historia, kansa, kulttuuri, 
ed. by Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden 
Seura, 1998), 28ff.
8  The expression was still in use in the 1930s, according to Mikael Björk, Myö karjalaizet: 
karelskspråkiga inslag i tidningen Laatokka under 1920- och 1930-talen (Helsinki: 
University of Helsinki, 2011), 59.
9  Heikki Kirkinen, “Keitä karjalaiset ovat?” Karjala: historia, kansa, kulttuuri, ed. by 
Pekka Nevalainen and Hannes Sihvo (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 
1998), 38.
10  Raivo, “Karjalan kasvot,” 21–23.
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“Karelianism” to a view on nationality with economy and territory as cen-
tral concepts, drawing inspiration from German geographer Friedrich Rat-
zel and Swede Rudolf Kjellén.11 Karelia’s coniferous forests were desired by 
the timber industry, Finland’s main source of wealth in the early twentieth 
century.12 Even today, Finland’s share of global trade in the forestry prod-
uct industry is around ten per cent, and two of the world’s biggest forestry 
companies are Finnish-owned, an enormous accomplishment for a country 
of its size.13 The political activities of leaders of the Finnish forestry industry 
in the early twentieth century have increasingly attracted scholarly atten-
tion.14 Connecting Finnishness and Karelianism to a vision of modernity 
and progress, Karelia could even be visualized as Prometheus, a culture 
hero sentenced to suffer for a noble cause: “because into the darkness of 
the North [it] brought fire from heaven // and from the slave of the soil, 
formed a human being.”15 
This progressive vision developed out of increased struggle, both against 
the attempts at centralization by the Russian Empire, as well as between 
different political tendencies within Finland. However, Karelia, split as it 
was between Finland and Russia, could not easily be used as an argument 
for Finnish independence from Russia. Scandinavia, on the other hand, 
provided examples of small nations associated with ideological qualities 
such as freedom and equality.16 During the first wave of Russification in 
1900, when Russia threatened to impose its own laws on autonomous Fin-
land, Väinö Voionmaa considered Finland a member of the Nordic coun-
tries (Pohjoismaat). He argued that although Finland had been separated 
from Sweden in 1809, it had not been split off from the Nordic nations, 
but developed into an equal partner in a brotherly union.17 Thus it could 
11  Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 96–98; 102–105. For Karelianism, see Raivo, “Karjalan 
kasvot,” 22–25.
12  Tapio Hämynen, “Karjalan yhteiskunta ja talous 1800-luvun lopulta toiseen 
maailmansotaan,” Karjala: historia, kansa, kulttuuri, ed. by Pekka Nevalainen and 
Hannes Sihvo (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1998), 189–205.
13  Markku Kuisma, Metsäteollisuuden maa: Suomi, metsät ja kansainvälinen järjestelmä 
1620–1920 (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2006), 13.
14  Kuisma, Metsäteollisuuden maa, 451–467. See also Oula Silvennoinen, Paperisydän: 
Gösta Serlachiuksen elämä (Helsinki: Siltala, 2012).
15  Otto Manninen, “Huokaavat korvet. Runo Karjalalle Kalevalanpäivänä 1921,” Suur-
Suomen runoja, ed. by Antero Manninen and Yrjö Vuorjoki (Helsinki: Sana, 1941), 34.
16  Bo Stråth, “Nordic modernity: origins, trajectories, perspectives,” Nordic paths to 
modernity, ed. by Jóhan Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2012), 29.
17  Väinö Voionmaa, “Neljäs pohjoismaa” (The Fourth Nordic Country), Kyläkirjaston 
Kuvalehti, 7 (1900), 82–84 (quoted in Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 99–100).
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be argued that Finland took active part in the positive qualities associated 
with the Scandinavian countries. However, Finnish debaters could pick and 
choose between those qualities depending on their political stance. Con-
servatives appreciated the Scandinavian monarchies, language national-
ists looked for allies for or against the Swedish language, and liberals as 
well as socialists collaborated with their peers.18
The crisis years of 1917–18 meant independence for Finland, but also the 
eruption of a bloody civil war. The revolutionary unrest in Russia created 
an opportunity for Finland to renegotiate its eastern borders.19 In a 1918 
article, Voionmaa discussed various models for a “Greater Finland,” set-
tling for the most modest option, namely Finland including East Karelia 
and the Kola Peninsula. For Voionmaa, this was a “natural neck of land,” 
a geographical unit in its own right.20 To protect its wholeness, cultural 
policies were also needed; Voionmaa worried that “Russification” threat-
ened the “primordial” cultural unit of Finns and Karelians.21 
The Swedish connection
In late April 1918, Red Finnish refugees from the Finnish Civil War started 
to gather in Russia and Sweden. Because of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
they could not hope for an immediate Bolshevik support for their cause.22 
Seemingly, the Red Guards in Finland had been abandoned in the hands of 
the vengeful Whites, and bitterness grew against the exiled leaders. Partly 
because of the volatile internal situation in the Finnish refugee community 
in Petrograd, some exiles advocated the foundation of a Finnish colony in 
Karelian Olonets.23 Meanwhile, the labour movement in Finland started 
to recover under the leadership of Social Democrats who had distanced 
themselves from the attempted revolution, and the exiles in Sweden were 
aware of the need to keep in touch with Finland as not to lose connection 
with the working class. The border between Finland and Soviet Russia was 
18  Cf. Ainur Elmgren, Den allrakäraste fienden – Svenska stereotyper i finländsk press 
1918–1939 (Lund: Sekel, 2008).
19  Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 110–111.
20  Väinö Voionmaa, “Suur-Suomi,” Kansanvalistusseuran kalenteri 1919 (Helsinki: 
Kansanvalistusseura, 1918), 6–9, 13, 20–21, 32 (quoted in Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 
112).
21  Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 106, 112.
22  Tauno Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty 1918–1919 (Tampere: Kansan 
sivistystyön liitto r.y., 1996), 28.
23  Ibid., 29–30.
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not impermeable, but nevertheless heavily controlled. Therefore, the Swed-
ish connection suddenly gained strategic relevance.24 
Edvard Gylling was among those exiles in Sweden who argued for 
the foundation of a colony in Karelia. From a bourgeois family of limited 
means, Gylling (1881–1938) became interested in the crofters’ situation as 
a student and defended a dissertation on the crofter question in Finland 
during Swedish rule. As a member of parliament for the Social Democratic 
Party, Gylling warned against the uprising of 1918 but accepted the post 
of secretary of finance in the revolutionary government, the Finnish Peo-
ple’s Delegation. In office, Gylling negotiated with Soviet Russia on several 
subjects, including an eventual cession of Russian Karelia to an independ-
ent Finland.25 The Finnish People’s Delegation claimed a large section of 
the Kola Peninsula and East Karelia for Finland, and, in Gylling’s words, 
wished that “the border between kindred peoples disappear.”26 It has been 
suggested that Gylling had adopted the principles and outlines of his Kare-
lia policy from Voionmaa.27 Gylling and Voionmaa had both been active in 
the Students’ Social Democrat Union 1905–07. Contemporaries were aware 
of the similarities in geopolitical interests and Voionmaa had to defend 
himself against allegations of participating in negotiations between the 
People’s Delegation and the Soviets.28 
After the defeat of the Red Guards at Tampere in 2–5 April 1918 by the 
White Finnish army and the capture of Helsinki by Imperial German forces 
in 14–15 April, Gylling took command of the revolutionary troops and led 
the final and ultimately unsuccessful defence of Viipuri. From this last 
front of the revolution in Finland, Gylling escaped – not to Petrograd, as 
many of his comrades had done, but to Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, 
in the summer of 1918.29
Finnish connections to Swedish and Norwegian radical socialists influ-
enced the conception of political action plans for Scandinavia in 1918–19. 
These connections were not self-evident, however. The Scandinavian labour 
movements maintained a tradition of cooperation from the late 1880s, with 
24  Cf. Max Engman, Gränsfall: utväxlingar och gränstrafik på Karelska näset 1918–1920 
(Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2008).
25  Nick Baron, Soviet Karelia: politics, planning and terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1920–1939 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 21; Markku Kangaspuro, “Nationalities policy and power 
in Soviet Karelia in the 1920s and 1930s,” Communism: national and international, ed. 
by Tauno Saarela and Kimmo Rentola (Tampere: Finnish Historical Society, 1998), 120.
26  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 24.
27  Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 135.
28  Ibid., 66, 126.
29  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 107–108.
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limited participation by the Finns. For example, the Scandinavian commit-
tee for cooperation founded in 1913 did not include Finland.30 This “labour 
Scandinavism” struggled with the historical memory of the original Scan-
dinavist movement, the failed attempt to unify Sweden-Norway and Den-
mark politically in the nineteenth century.31 
After the split of the labour movement during the First World War and 
the founding of the Communist International, the left-wing in Scandina-
via rekindled cooperation, centred in Stockholm. The Swedish Left Social-
ists had established close contacts with Russian revolutionaries under the 
war.32 Particularly Sweden and Norway became important for Soviet Rus-
sia during the Entente’s blockade 1918–20. Stockholm was one of the first 
cities where a regional committee of the Communist International was 
founded, functioning as news agency, communications centre and bank, 
in the spring of 1919.33 However, there were several groups vying for an 
important position in the international movement. The patchy history of 
the organizations founded by Finnish exiles in Sweden also reveals rival-
ries and ambitious projects that never took off, due to sudden dispersal of 
activists or simply a lack of human and material resources.
The Scandinavian Revolutionary Committee and other 
organizations
Long before the October Revolution, Finns and Russians, separatists as 
well as revolutionaries, had used the route over the border river Tornio 
between Finland and Sweden to smuggle activists and materials in and 
out of Russia.34 The route remained important after the Finnish Civil 
War when the Red Finnish exiles in Stockholm were planning to rebuild 
30  Tauno Saarela, “Nordic communists in the Communist International,” Finnish 
communism visited, ed. By Tauno Saarela (Helsinki: The Finnish Society for Labour 
History, Papers on Labour History VII, 2015), 92.
31  Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, “Introduction: ‘Nordic democracy’ in a world 
of tensions,” Rhetorics of Nordic democracy, Studia Fennica Historica 17, ed. by Jussi 
Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2011), 23.
32  Cf. Aleksander Kan, Hemmabolsjevikerna: den svenska socialdemokratin, ryska 
bolsjeviker och mensjeviker under världskriget och revolutionsåren 1914–1920 (Stockholm: 
Carlssons, 2005).
33  Saarela, “Nordic communists,” 91–93.
34  Tauno Saarela and Kevin Morgan, “Salaperäiset suomalaiset ja Britannian 
kommunismin synty,” Aave vai haave, ed. by Tauno Saarela et al. (Saarijärvi: Työväen 
historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 1998), 8; cf. Michael Futrell, Northern 
underground (London: Faber and Faber, 1963); Hans Björkegren, Ryska posten – de 
ryska revolutionärerna i Norden 1906–1917 (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1985).
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contacts with their old homeland. A “Scandinavian Revolutionary Com-
mittee” (Skandinavian Vallankumouskomitea) was formed in Stockholm 
to facilitate the mobilization of the refugees in Sweden. According to offi-
cial estimates, the refugees numbered about 573 during 1917–20. Most of 
them were men from Northern Finland.35 The politically radical refugees 
soon controlled even the apolitical organizations that had been founded 
to support Finns in Sweden.36
Organizer Jussi Railo (1887–1920) arrived in Sweden from Moscow in 
early July 1918 to establish contacts between the emigrant community and 
Finland.37 He was a former Social Democrat Member of Parliament and 
secretary of the party’s radical Youth League. When the Communist Party 
of Finland was founded in Moscow 29 August 1918, a Scandinavian Revo-
lutionary Committee was appointed as its local party committee in Stock-
holm, with Railo in charge.38 The committee contacted union leaders in 
Helsinki to distribute aid from Scandinavia to persecuted Reds and their 
families. It sent money to arrange the travels of Edvard Gylling and others 
still in hiding in Finland. The committee also lent support to at least one 
Norwegian comrade, and it arranged meetings in Oslo and Stockholm for 
travellers on the way to the second congress of the Third International to 
be held in Petrograd and Moscow in the summer of 1920.39 Most impor-
tantly for this study, the committee produced several organizational plans 
for military and agitational activities involving Finland, Sweden and Nor-
way in the autumn and winter of 1918–19.40 
The Stockholm committee of the Communist Party of Finland and the 
Scandinavian Committee of the Communist International seem to have 
partly fused in 1920. The first preserved report of the activities of the Com-
intern’s committee was signed in the handwriting of Swedish Left Socialist 
35  Matti Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta Tornion laaksossa 1918–1939 
(Oulu: Kustannus Pohjoinen, 1991), 18–19; The name of the committee is mentioned 
in a letter quoted in Matti Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? Jääkäriliikkeen ja 
jääkäripataljoona 27:n (1915–1918) synty, luonne, mielialojen vaihteluita ja sisäisiä kriisejä 
sekä niiden heijastuksia itsenäisen Suomen ensi vuosiin saakka (Helsinki: Otava, 2000), 
653.
36  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 19.
37  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 107.
38  From 1918 to 1920, the party’s name was Suomalainen kommunistinen puolue (”Finnish 
Communist Party”). In 1920, the name was changed to Suomen kommunistinen puolue 
(”Communist Party of Finland”). Tauno Saarela and Kimmo Rentola, “Introduction,” 
Communism, national and international, ed. by Tauno Saarela and Kimmo Rentola 
(Tampere: Finnish Historical Society, 1998), 10. 
39  Saarela and Morgan, “Salaperäiset suomalaiset,” 8–9.
40  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 108–109.
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Zeth Höglund and Finn Mauno Heimo.41 Heimo had been an assistant to 
Adolph Joffe, the Soviet ambassador to Berlin, and became the permanent 
secretary of the Stockholm committee of the Communist Party of Fin-
land.42 The Comintern’s Scandinavian Committee also aided Finns finan-
cially and engaged them in various tasks, including sending two Finns to 
build a Red Army in Great Britain.43 
The numerous organizations, often involving the same individuals in 
different roles, have confused historians working with incomplete mate-
rial. Missing sources make it difficult to determine whether the Scandi-
navian Revolutionary Committee, founded in 1918 with Jussi Railo as its 
leader, and the “Swedish Battalion of the Red Guard of Finland” (Suomen 
punaisen kaartin Ruotsin pataljoona), founded at the latest in early 1919 in 
Stockholm with Railo as its commander under the alias “Mäntymäki,” were 
actually the same organization.44 In his work on secret Communist activi-
ties in the Tornio river valley in 1918–39, written in 1991, historian Matti 
Lackman had expressed the hope that archives that were only just being 
opened would bring clarity to the confusing turns around the foundation 
of the Stockholm committee.45 However, the Scandinavian Revolutionary 
Committee’s history is still waiting to be written in detail.
The Red jägers – shock troops of Red Scandinavia?
Exiled Finns who had settled in Northern Sweden established connections 
with Finland via Luleå and the border town Haparanda. Some of them had 
experience of cross-border connections through the jäger movement (1914–
18). The jägers were militant independence activists who clandestinely left 
Finland to receive military education in the Imperial German army. Its 
core was the Royal Prussian Jäger Battalion 27 (Königlich Preußisches Jäger-
battalion Nr. 27), which had seen action at the Eastern Front.46 Auswärtiges 
Amt and the German General Staff were promoting the idea to establish 
a buffer zone of economically, culturally and politically subjected nations 
towards Russia. They provided support to separatists in the territories of 
Germany’s geopolitical opponents. While the initiative to the jäger pro-
ject was taken by the Finnish activists, Germany set strict conditions for 
41  Kan, Hemmabolsjevikerna, 437.
42  Ibid., 438.
43  Saarela, “Nordic communists,” 93. Kan, Hemmabolsjevikerna, 457.
44  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 647–648.
45  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 19.
46  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 693.
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the jäger training according to its own interests, as it set the conditions for 
its direct military support to the White government in the last stages of 
the Finnish Civil War. 47 Many jägers with Socialist sympathies, or those 
who had simply criticized Germany, were seen as politically unreliable by 
their own officers.48 70 per cent of the jägers (about 1,300 men) returned 
to Finland before and during the Civil War, 451 men returned later. Only 
those who committed themselves to the White government were allowed 
to return to participate in the conflict.49
The new revolutionary phase expected by the Communists in the 
autumn of 1918 aimed at a Scandinavian revolution, but it relied on the 
development of events in Germany connected to the German revolution in 
November 1918. German troops and advisers left Finland, which was liber-
ated from its numerous commitments to Germany. Inspired by the upris-
ings in Germany, the Communist Party of Finland sent leaflets to Finland 
declaring world revolution. As relatives and former comrades of the jägers 
remaining in Germany began to press Finnish officials for their repatriation, 
Finland and Germany arranged for their transport by train via Sweden.50
Some of the socialist sympathizers among the jägers became active in 
the clandestine organizations of the Communist Party of Finland. Via the 
student Mauno Heimo at the Soviet embassy in Berlin, the “Red jägers” 
established contacts with Jussi Railo and the Scandinavian Revolutionary 
Committee in Stockholm. In the summer of 1918, Railo wrote to Heimo 
suggesting that the Red jägers would receive support from Moscow and 
Swedish contacts “if they begin to work for the propagation of Commu-
nism in the army” in Finland. In the letter, “Hedman” (possibly a pseudo-
nym of Gylling), announced that the Committee invited at least 5-10 jägers, 
experts in various fields, to Stockholm for negotiations. In November 1918, 
a group of jägers travelled to Stockholm to meet Gylling and other leaders 
of the committee. Military issues were probably discussed, as the jägers 
represented different military branches, but no sources remain.51
The latecomer jägers returning via the Haparanda-Tornio route aroused 
suspicion among the border guards but also at the Finnish Embassy in 
Stockholm.52 Finnish military intelligence intercepted letters addressed to 
Viktor Vilhelm Vuokko, a Swedish citizen of Finnish origin in Stockholm, 
47  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 54.
48  Ibid., 559–561.
49  Ibid., 557–559, 570.
50  Ibid., 633, 674, 648–652.
51  Ibid., 653, 655–656.
52  Ibid., 566–567.
297Ainur Elmgren: The Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia
who functioned as the official publisher of the Finnish-language newspaper 
Viesti. The letters contained reports of the situation and mood in Finland 
and were actually directed to Railo’s organization.53 Viesti was printed in 
Stockholm and published news from Finland and contributions by Swed-
ish Left Socialists, such as Zeth Höglund and the Stockholm mayor Carl 
Lindhagen, and Social Democrats, such as Rickard Sandler.54 It is not clear 
how much these contributors knew about the clandestine activities of the 
newspaper’s publisher.
Some of the Red jägers remained in Sweden. Using the manuals of the 
Communist Party of Finland’s military wing, they wrote training manu-
als for the Red Guard with innocuous cover names such as The villagers’ 
songbook and Guide to beekeeping. These pamphlets were used to train Red 
Guards, and samples were also smuggled into Finland. Red jägers were 
confident that they had the support of the majority of the population in 
the north.55 High hopes and external pressure made the Stockholm exiles 
produce ambitious plans. The Finnish leaders in Moscow still believed that 
revolution could be rekindled in their old country. The Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of Finland sent member Lauri Letonmäki to 
Stockholm via Germany in January 1919. He appointed the Stockholm 
committee to organize a march into Finland and expected all troops in 
Sweden and Norway to be ready for action no later than 15 February. It is 
possible that travelling through a fervently revolutionary Germany con-
vinced Letonmäki that world revolution was at hand.56
The lagging preparations caused disagreements within the Communist 
Party of Finland. Only a few primitive exercises had been organized in 
Northern and Eastern Finland in the spring of 1919. Unsuccessful attempts 
to recruit comrades in Southern Finland led to several denouncements to 
the authorities. In April 1919, most of the involved jägers in Finland were 
arrested, but by lack of concrete evidence, only three of them were sen-
tenced without parole.57 
Authorities in Finland were conscious of the threat from the North. The 
Third Department of the General Staff, the military intelligence bureau of 
the Finnish Army, gathered claims from various sources that an attack on 
Finland was imminent, because the Communists of Sweden – and of the 
53  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 659.
54  Arvo Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling: Itä-Karjalan suomalainen rakentaja (Helsinki: 
Otava, 1976), 114–115. Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 643.
55  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 663–664.
56  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 110–112.
57  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 665–671.
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whole North – were prepared for wide-scale action. The border crossing 
over Tornio River, between Haparanda on the Swedish side and Tornio on 
the Finnish side, was frequented by smugglers, fugitives and other tres-
passers. Special passports gave locals the right to travel freely across the 
border, and authorities supplied them quite indiscriminately, at least in 
the opinion of military intelligence officers.58 
Authorities could also be misled by rumours and their own prejudices. 
There was ideological resistance against the notion that Northerners could 
be revolutionaries. When the Red jäger affair in Helsinki was revealed, the 
chairman of the local jäger office, Major Erik Heinrichs, was disturbed 
by the amount of “Swedes from Ostrobothnia” among the politically sus-
pect jägers. Heinrichs emphasized that these were generally good people, 
“although stubborn and disobedient.”59 The case inflamed the already ram-
pant conflict between pro-German jägers and Russian-educated officers in 
the Finnish Army.60 When the Detective Central Police (Etsivä Keskuspoli-
isi, Detektiva Centralpolisen) took over intelligence work in August 1919, it 
was barely able to grasp the special nature of the Northern problem until 
former jäger activists, with personal experiences of clandestine political 
activities across the border, took over leading positions. Esko Riekki, for-
merly a jäger recruiter himself, was leading the Tornio section in February 
1920 and warned that “Red jägers” were infiltrating the lumber fields to 
agitate the workers.61 Riekki’s familiarity with the border region improved 
the Detective Central Police’s results in the North once he became its chief 
in 1 September 1922.62
The “Swedish Battalion of the Red Guard of Finland” and the 
Nordic War Plan
The Communist Party of Finland adopted the idea that the Bolsheviks 
had succeeded because of their clandestine strategy. The military wing of 
the party saw a lack of training personnel as the chief reason for the fail-
ure of the Finnish revolution.63 These analyses inspired the creation of an 
organization called the “Swedish Battalion of the Red Guard of Finland” 
58  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 21–23.
59  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 671.
60  Ibid., 672–673.
61  Ibid., 676.
62  Cf. Matti Lackman, Esko Riekki – jääkärivärväri, Etsivän Keskuspoliisin päällikkö, 
SS-pataljoonan luoja (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2007).
63  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 647.
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(Suomen Punaisen Kaartin Ruotsin pataljoona) and the “Nordic War Plan” 
(Pohjoinen sotasuunnitelma), a grand scheme of a revolutionary military 
campaign in Northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland, produced by the 
Stockholm committee.64 The controversial documents, including the plan 
and despatches of the Battalion, were used as evidence in a widely pub-
licised spy case against Finnish and Swedish Communists in 1921.65 The 
actual author of the Nordic War Plan was Jussi Railo under the pseudonym 
“Mäntymäki” while Gylling wrote the comments appearing on the right-
hand side of the document.66 The different surviving documents detail-
ing the plans contain contradictory claims, numbers and concepts, which 
probably reflects rapidly changing external circumstances. Geographical 
designations for “Scandinavia” and “the North” are used interchangeably 
by Railo and Gylling.
The strategically most important areas for the activities of the Battal-
ion, also outlined in the Nordic War Plan, were in the North. Many social 
and economic reasons prepared the ground for a revolution in the forests 
dominated by the timber industry. Many Finns also worked in the iron ore 
fields of Norrbotten. The labour movement in the North had radicalized 
after the general strike of 1909, and the local workers tended to support the 
radical Left Socialists that had split from the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party in conjunction with the 1917 revolutionary movements in Sweden.67 
Railo’s plan was to dislodge the White forces from Murmansk and Kare-
lia with troops consisting of Finns in Sweden and trustworthy Swedes 
and Norwegians.68 The Nordic War Plan required several shock troops of 
100–150 men each to be formed in different locations in the Tornio River 
valley. This part of Railo’s plan most likely referred to the “Swedish Bat-
talion of the Red Guard of Finland.” The troops would pass clandestinely 
through the wilderness of North Finland to Karelia, joined by sympathetic 
Swedes, Norwegians, and veterans from the Murmansk legion. After a 
week’s rest, the troops would take control of the Murmansk railroad and 
64  The first despatch of the Swedish Battalion of the Red Guard of Finland is dated 
1 April 1919 and is quoted in part in Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 105–106. The Nordic 
War Plan in its entirety is quoted in Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 350–355, and Lackman, 
Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 118–123.
65  Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 104.
66  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 111; Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 108.
67  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 28.
68  Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 350–355.
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stop the Whites from retaking it. A troop of 40–50 men from Finnmark in 
Norway was also expected to intercept the Whites on the Kola Peninsula.69 
After explaining that thorough intelligence gathering was necessary 
before such an endeavour, the author “Mäntymäki” (Railo) suggested – 
rather disappointingly – that it would be best to give up such an ambitious 
plan, because there were too many difficulties to be overcome. But if not, 
it ought to be taken as a serious suggestion for creating a “North Euro-
pean International Red Army” (Pohjois-Euroopan internationalinen puna-
armeija) in cooperation with the Soviet Russian government, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Finland, its bureau in Finland, 
and the “revolutionary groups” in Sweden and Norway. In Gylling’s com-
ments, he added that such a plan demanded “a kind of Scandinavian Red 
Army” (Skandinaavinen Puna-Armeija), which he estimated to be impos-
sible to create in the required strength ( “at least a war-strength battalion, 
approximately 3,000 men, well equipped”).70
The draft of the Nordic War Plan was finished by Railo on 11 January on 
an urgent schedule – execution of the plan was to commence 15 January–15 
February.71 Several vital organizations did not even exist yet, including the 
necessary Scandinavian volunteer army.72 One might ask why Railo and 
Gylling would concoct such an ambitious plan if they themselves admitted 
that it would be impossible to fulfil its goals. It was certainly dependent on 
very specific political circumstances that would change very soon. Await-
ing further information, Red jägers were mobilized as military instruc-
tors.73 Training was organized around Sweden and Northern Finland, 
possibly even in Kristiansand and Sande in Norway, according to reports 
gathered by the Swedish police.74 If these reports are correct, a very small 
amount of men participated in the training sessions, between 5 and 20 on 
every location, giving the sum of little more than 60 activists. A radiogram 
69  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 52–53. “This clearly proves that the idea 
of a Scandinavian Soviet Republic was a fact!” Lackman adds.
70  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 53–54, 118–123.
71  Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 119. Lackman (Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 52) 
interprets the plan’s dates as 15 January–15 February 1920, but the exact year is not 
specified in the text. Saarela (Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 111–112) interprets the 
dates as 15 January–15 February 1919 and connects the Nordic War Plan with the incursion 
of the Red jägers in Finland later that year. However, the military training commenced 
on a less urgent schedule in spring 1919, as the dates of the remaining despatches show 
(Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 105–106).
72  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 111–112.
73  Lackman, Suomen vai Saksan puolesta? 663.
74  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 28, 30–31.
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from Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov to People’s Commissar of Foreign 
Relations, Georgy Chicherin, reporting on the arrival of Finnish military 
instructors to Petsamo, confirmed that the Russian Bolsheviks were aware 
of the activities in Northern Scandinavia in the winter of 1919–20.75
In the summer of 1921, the Swedish police arrested several Swedish and 
Finnish citizens who were accused of acting against the constitution, con-
spiring for treason, and attempting to found “a Swedish Soviet Republic 
and a dictatorship of the proletariat.”76 The Stockholm police had already 
been conducting surveillance on about 400 political refugees of Finnish 
origin. Many of the Swedish suspects were originally from the borderlands 
between Sweden and Finland with a historically Finnish-speaking popu-
lation. The trials were intensely publicized, and the accused received some 
support from well-known Socialists, such as Ture Nerman of the Social 
Democratic Left and Georg Branting of the Social Democratic Party. On 
28 October 1921, the prosecutor presented his most incriminating evidence: 
“The Nordic War Plan,” which at that point was thought to have been writ-
ten by Edvard Gylling.77
The documents and interrogation protocols from this trial show that 
Communist activity was rife around the whole Cap of the North, including 
the far north of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This region clearly played 
an important role in the revolutionary plans concerning Scandinavia. 
The police files indicated there was a kind of military organization by the 
Finnish Reds centered in North Sweden in 1919–21. The Finnish Commu-
nists in Sweden also maintained a motorboat connection to Murmansk 
via Vardø in Norway.78 One of the arrested claimed that the plan to create 
a “Swedish battalion of the Red Guards of Finland” was already conceived 
in Finland during the civil war of 1918. The battalion was to function as a 
counterweight to the brigade of Swedish volunteers on the White side.79
The storm unleashed by the trial soon died down. By the time the war 
plan was discovered by the Swedish authorities, the international situa-
tion had changed completely. External pressure on Soviet Russia had eased 
while world revolution seemed less and less feasible.80 Many activists had 
75  Kan, Hemmabolsjevikerna, 462–463. Financing alternatives suggested by Gylling: 
“a) 2 million Swedish kr. b) 5 million Finnish mk. c) 5 million Czar roubles. Where do 
we get it?” Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 354.
76  Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 102.
77  Ibid., 101–104.
78  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 38.
79  Ibid., 24–25.
80  Ibid., 48.
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moved on to other tasks. One Red jäger, who was training troops in Nor-
way, remarked bitterly that 70–80 of his best men had left to work in Spits-
bergen.81 Possibly the Finns in Stockholm had felt the noose tighten long 
before the case became public. Railo, the ambitious organizer in Stock-
holm, had suffered from depression and committed suicide in late January 
1920.82 Gylling had escaped in April 1920 to Soviet Russia.83 His few Swed-
ish friends and supporters included the Stockholm mayor Carl Lindhagen 
and Hugo Sillén of the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s Youth League. 
Implication of public figures kept the Swedish newspapers interested in 
the spy trial for some time, but when no proof of actual damage to Swed-
ish interests could be found, and many of the Finnish Reds had already 
left the country, the case dried up. In the absence of leaders, two persons 
were sentenced to a few years each in prison – one Finn, Henrik Johan 
Paulin, in whose wardrobe the Nordic War Plan had been found, and one 
Finnish-speaking Swede from Norrbotten, William Jacobsson-Heikkinen, 
who had helped the Finnish refugees together with a Norwegian woman, 
Agnes Enbuske.84
The identities of these two and their accomplices only hint at the poten-
tial Nordic network behind the revolutionary movement. The Communism 
of the Cap of the North enjoyed transnational support across the borders in 
Finland, Sweden and Norway.85 This provided some help for the activities 
of the newly-formed Communist Party of Finland, as these neighbouring 
countries maintained peaceful relations with Finland. Finnish was also 
widely spoken on the Swedish and the Norwegian sides of the border, and 
many Communists had local ties in the area. Therefore, it is understandable 
that the “Scandinavian Soviet Republic” was imagined to cover the whole 
Cap of the North. However, national differences also hampered coopera-
tion, as those Finns who had remained in Finland after 1918 were reluc-
tant to take up arms again. Rumours about the Nordic War Plan deepened 
the divide between the Communists and the reformist Social Democratic 
Party of Finland. Perhaps Railo had created the whole plan trusting solely 
81  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 34.
82  Markku Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu itsehallinnosta (Helsinki: Suoma-
laisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2000a), 74; Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 
49–54, 118–123. Lackman connects Railo’s suicide to the spy trial, although the latter 
took place more than a year later.
83  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 24–25.
84  Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 111–113.
85  Saarela, “Nordic communists,” 88–95.
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in the energy and activism of the Red jägers, who failed to mobilize dis-
content among their peers in Finland.86 
The plans for a Scandinavian Socialist Republic were not completely 
scrapped. From his Stockholm exile in early 1920, Gylling penned a new 
plan: the foundation of a Karelian Labour Commune.87 His experiences 
of territorial negotiation with Soviet Russia for the Finnish People’s Del-
egation in 1918 gained new relevance. One way to convince the Soviets to 
accept self-rule for the labour commune was to appeal to the possibility 
of a Scandinavian revolution.
Negotiations in 1920: the Karelian Labour Commune
Already in the negotiations with Soviet Russia in late spring 1918, as the 
defeat of the Finnish revolution became imminent, Gylling had planned 
to evacuate the Red Guards to Soviet-controlled Karelia and found an 
autonomous labour commune.88 Before the Fenno-Soviet peace negotia-
tions in Tartu, Gylling sent a new proposal for a Karelian Labour Com-
mune, written at some point during his stay in Sweden from autumn 1918 
to spring 1920, to Yrjö Sirola, chairman of the Communist Party of Fin-
land in Moscow.89 Sirola belonged to those Red leaders who had escaped to 
Petrograd in April 1918. Gylling’s plan was translated for the use People’s 
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic, or Narkomindel, the Soviet Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
on 24 March 1920.90
Gylling’s original proposal presented the Karelian Labour Commune 
both as a model state and a bulwark protecting Soviet Russia.91 Without 
direct involvement of the Soviet Russian central government, “it could 
carry out revolutionary agitation and […] ideologically prepare the ground 
for the Finnish revolution.” But not only for Finland: in the proposal, Gyl-
ling stated that Karelia geographically belonged to Scandinavia: “In the 
northern parts, its borders are very close to Sweden, Norway, and Finland. 
86  Saarela, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 113–114, 117.
87  Lackman, Kommunistien salainen toiminta, 54.
88  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 74; Lackman, Kommunistien salainen 
toiminta, 55–60.
89  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 75; Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 109ff.
90  Kangaspuro 2000a, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 75, note 29; Ylärakkola, Edvard 
Gylling, 111. This version of the proposal differs slightly from the German-language 
version, possibly a draft, found in Stockholm during the trials in 1921.
91  Quoted in its entirety in Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 347–349. Translated into Finnish 
by Pentti Pärssinen from the original German.
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It is a strategic starting-point to revolutionize Scandinavia. From there, it 
is possible to direct revolutionary activities in all of these states. We could 
gather comrades from these countries there, for economic labour, or directly 
into military formation.”92
The Cap of the North was an especially interesting region for an inter-
nationalist project because its borders did not correspond to the distribu-
tion of inhabitants. Gylling did not mention the Saami people, but those 
nations that supplied the majority of the local proletariat had an active role 
in his scheme: “There, we could create Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian 
regiments equally. Both Northern Norway and Northern Sweden provide 
a sound basis for this kind of activity. The coming revolution in Scandina-
via would gain both material and moral protection from a Karelian Com-
mune. Thus, it would become a Scandinavian test case, and together with 
the other Scandinavian countries, part of a Scandinavian Soviet Repub-
lic. The left socialist movements within Scandinavia and the Scandinavian 
group in the Third International already form an ideal basis for a Scandi-
navian Soviet Republic.”93
Even more ambitiously, he envisioned Scandinavia as a trailblazer for 
the rest of the world as a “Scandinavian Soviet republic” would “dictate 
its will” to the capitalist West through the creation of a powerful timber 
monopoly. “[...] there could be a revolution in Scandinavia independently 
from the world revolution, because of the existence of a Scandinavian 
Soviet Republic with Russia as its economic and military backup, and it 
would not be possible to attack militarily, and economically this repub-
lic could even control the timber and paper production in Europe, and 
thus dictate its will also to the capitalist Western states. The Scandinavian 
Soviet Republic would also be an important stepping-stone on the path to 
world revolution.”94 
This implied the conquest of the Finnish timber industry, which had 
just started to recover and expand after the disastrous wartime slump. The 
post-war world was reconstructing itself and forestry products from lumber 
to paper were in high demand. The devaluation of the Finnish mark led to 
increased sales and enormous profits for the sawmill owners while their 
wartime loans diminished.95 The disappearance of Russia from the timber 
market meant another opportunity for expansion, which the Finns indulged 
92  Quoted in Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 349. My translation.
93  Quoted in ibid., 349.
94  Quoted in ibid., 349. Both letters are also quoted in Baron, Soviet Karelia, 21.
95  Kuisma, Metsäteollisuuden maa, 677–682.
305Ainur Elmgren: The Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia
in by underbidding their Swedish and Norwegian rivals “ruthlessly.”96 A 
“Scandinavian Socialist Republic” would unite the Scandinavian competi-
tors into a massive monopoly on the market.
Gylling envisioned the Karelian Labour Commune as an independent 
economic unit, with full rights of self-administration of internal affairs and 
education. Independently from Russia, it would unite the Finnish nation-
ality, protect East Karelia and the Murmansk railroad, and create a “safe 
gate” to the North-West via the Arctic Sea. Gylling emphasized the admin-
istrative autonomy of the Commune. Its leadership was to consist of per-
sons who supported national autonomy unconditionally. Gylling wanted 
at least 50 per cent of the population to consist of Finns and Karelians. A 
certain degree of “Karelian nationalism and Finnish ideology” was to be 
allowed as a counter-measure to White Finn agitation. This would consti-
tute a positive influence on Finnish smallholder farmers, who would be in 
a key position in a coming revolution beyond the borders.97 
Economic and geographic factors made Karelia a member of the Nordic 
countries and Gylling intended it to stay that way. Therefore it would join 
them after the revolution in a new Socialist Soviet Republic. As is evident 
from the quote cited above, Gylling believed that the revolution could be 
realized in Scandinavia independently from any European developments. 
Because the Nordic countries were protected by Soviet Russia, the West 
would be deterred from intervention – unlike Germany in Finland after 
Brest-Litovsk in 1918.98 
Even the NKVD entertained the idea of a Scandinavian revolution. 
When the Politburo of the All-Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) 
discussed the East Karelian question in May 1920, the deputy leader of the 
NKVD supported Karelian autonomy, as long as the goal was Scandina-
vian revolution.99 Other examples of similar usage of ethnic or national 
irredenta existed at the time. The West Ukrainians in Poland were invited 
to join a Soviet Ukraine, and Moldavian autonomy was founded to impress 
the Bessarabians. Romania had invaded Bessarabia in the First World 
War, and Soviet Russia never accepted this loss. The Moldavian Autono-
mous Socialist Soviet Republic was founded in 1924 to bring revolution to 
Bessarabia, and the language spoken by Bessarabian Moldavians became its 
96  Ibid., 687–688.
97  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 75–76.
98  Ibid., 78–82.
99  Ibid., 78. Kangaspuro quotes his name as “M. F. Vladimirsk,” which I have not been 
able to confirm.
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official language.100 The choice of Finnish as the official language instead of 
Karelian followed a similar logic as the choice of the dialect spoken by the 
urban, Russian-influenced population of central Uzbekistan, while local 
nationalists supported rural variants of the language.101
Gylling met Vladimir Lenin in May 1920 to make his case, and left a 
favourable impression: “He would make a good prime minister for any 
country whatsoever,” Lenin wrote after the meeting.102 Lenin accepted 
Gylling’s proposal, and Narkomindel passed a decree ratifying the posi-
tion of East Karelia as an autonomous labour commune on 7 June 1920.103 
In August, the Communist Party of Finland was still confused about the 
implications of the foundation of the Commune. Verner Forstén, who had 
years of experience in the Finnish organizations within the All-Russian 
Communist Party (bolsheviks), asked the newly-arrived Gylling if he was 
serious about the possibility of administrative autonomy. Gylling assured 
him that the political situation made such liberties possible. The revolu-
tion had not yet succeeded in the Nordic countries, and therefore Karelia 
was needed as an example of Finland and Scandinavia.104
On 8 June 1920, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in Mos-
cow issued a declaration that a regional unit, the Karelian Labour Com-
mune (Karel’skaia trudnaia kommuna, Karjalan työkansan kommuuni), 
was to be formed in the Karelian-populated areas of Olonets and Arkhan-
gelsk. Edvard Gylling was appointed as its Chairman of the Council of 
the People’s Commissars. Historian Nick Baron points out in his book 
on Soviet Karelia how the lack of further detailed instruction in purpose, 
status and territorial extension “is a measure of the contradictions, con-
flicting aspirations and countervailing tensions of ideology and exigency” 
prevalent in early Soviet state building.105 This enabled both the theoretical 
expansion of the revolution beyond Soviet borders in the early 1920s and 
the actual territorial expansion of the autonomous republic of Karelia in 
1922–24. However, it had no constitutional guarantee for its protection.106
100  Terry Martin, The affirmative action empire: nations and nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 274–275.
101  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 101.
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Edward Gylling argued that Soviet Karelia was ideal as a base for a 
Scandinavian revolution because the long border made a speedy revolu-
tion possible – first in Finland, then in the other Nordic countries.107 In 
February 1921, Gylling penned a note on Karelian autonomy where he 
stated his aim to create a “Scandinavian revolutionary centre” in Karelia 
by means of collaboration with Scandinavian socialist parties.108 Another 
task of the Commune was to provide a safe haven for Finnish commu-
nists.109 The Finnish exiles maintained contacts with their old homeland, 
either directly or via Sweden and Norway. They also assumed the posi-
tion of an intelligentsia with the task of leading the Karelian nation. “Red 
Scandinavianism” provided a sense of purpose for the exiled Finnish rev-
olutionaries, who attempted to rebuild their lost Red Finland within the 
borders of Soviet Karelia.
The sense of urgency diminished as the hopes for a German revolu-
tion were dashed in 1923. Joseph Stalin’s 1924 speech on “Socialism in one 
country” put the first nail in the coffin of the original raison d’être of Kare-
lian autonomy.110
Why the Karelian Labour Commune? Security, economic power, 
nationalism
The Soviet leadership’s acceptance of Gylling’s plan has usually been 
explained in terms of geopolitics, security policy and economic necessity. 
Bolsheviks needed to make peace at the north-western border to protect 
the Murmansk railroad. Karelia was in dire need of peace for develop-
ment, as it lacked basic infrastructure, telegraph lines, roads and means of 
transport.111 The borderlands between the Arctic Sea and the Gulf of Fin-
land had witnessed constantly flaring conflicts during 1918–20, involving 
various interventionist forces, the British, White Russians, Karelian sepa-
ratists, White Finns, Germans, Americans, Poles, and even a smattering 
of French and Serbian troops supporting the British in the Arkhangelsk 
campaign.112 Lenin and Chicherin were ready to solve the Karelia question 
107  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 75–76; Baron, Soviet Karelia, 21.
108  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 28.
109  Edvard Gylling, “Suuret rauhan viestit” (Great messages of peace) Karjalan Kommuuni 
9.10.1920; Anonymous, “Neuvosto-Karjalan vuosipäivänä” (On the anniversary of Soviet 
Karelia) Karjalan Kommuuni 7.6.1923.
110  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 28–29.
111  Kangaspuro, “Nationalities policy and power,” 120–121.
112  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 25–26.
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due to the unrest in the region.113 Most importantly for Gylling’s case, the 
Soviet leaders had more pressing concerns around its borders – including 
the Polish counter-offensive in the spring of 1920. 
As Chicherin had disclosed in communication with Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the Comintern and Petrograd party chairman 
Grigory Zinoviev, the first negotiations between White Finland and Soviet 
Russia had proven that unless the Karelian question was solved in a sat-
isfactory way for the local population, it would be impossible to make a 
peace treaty with Finland.114 Karelia as a base for revolutionary activities 
in Finland and Scandinavia was an intriguing idea to the Soviet leader-
ship, but it was more urgent to find a solution for the border question at the 
peace negotiations with Finland in Tartu. Finland insisted that the peace 
treaty would contain a statement on the rights of autonomous Karelia and 
its native population. The Fenno-Soviet treaty of Tartu was signed on 14 
October 1920 amidst loud protests from the Finnish right wing. The Soviet 
declaration “Concerning Self-Government for East Karelia,” which was 
attached to the treaty, was partly based on Gylling’s outline. The Finnish 
negotiators interpreted “East Karelia” differently from the Soviets; since the 
“Karelian Labour Commune” was not mentioned by name, they avoided 
giving formal recognition to it.115 
The national question was also ideologically central to the development 
of the Soviet state. Although the Bolsheviks thought of nationalism as a 
“masking ideology,” hiding the actual class interests of the bourgeoisie, 
Lenin and Stalin concluded that by granting national self-determination 
to oppressed peoples, the class conflict would emerge when the struggle 
for nationhood had been fulfilled. Therefore, Finland was granted inde-
pendence in 1917. National consciousness was also seen as a consequence 
of the capitalist mode of production and thus an unavoidable historical 
phase towards higher levels of development; therefore, by developing the 
national consciousness of the “backwards” Karelians, Finns could serve 
the revolution in the long run. In Stalin’s words in 1929, “We are undertak-
ing the maximum development of national culture so that it will exhaust 
itself completely and thereby create the base for the organization of inter-
national socialist culture.”116 
113  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 84.
114  Ibid., 76.
115  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 22–23; Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 84–85.
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Both Red Finns and Soviet leaders agreed that Karelian national iden-
tity was to be developed in a Soviet-friendly direction, but their goals were 
quite different. Soviet Russia was planning to place Karelia firmly under 
state control with the help of propaganda produced by the Finns while the 
Finnish intelligentsia intended to build a Socialist “Greater Finland” and 
ultimately a Socialist Scandinavia.117 In 1924, Gylling explained the impor-
tance of Karelia as an “advance guard” of world revolution as the effect 
of its location close to Scandinavia: “Whichever work is done there and 
whichever results are achieved, the news thereof will easily travel to the 
capitalist countries in the west and reach the proletarian masses. We have 
some experience of this already. Just the message of the foundation of the 
Karelian Commune inspired a wide response among workers, not only in 
Finland but generally in Scandinavia.”118
The strength of such an undeveloped region was its potential for eco-
nomic development – its barely exploited natural resources. According 
to Gylling’s ambitious economic plans, the future Scandinavian Soviet 
Republic would build a timber industry monopoly in Western Europe.119 
The development was to remain firmly in the hands of the leaders of the 
autonomous labour commune, and its forces would participate in the labour 
struggle on the capitalist side of the border. A Karelian Jäger Battalion was 
formed under the command of local Red Finns as a national army to pro-
tect its western borders.120 
Gylling’s revolutionary committee attempted to protect the economic 
autonomy by resisting certain aspects of the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
such as the plan of to allow “Finnish Capitalists” rights to exploit the 
Karelian forests. Gylling wrote to Narkomindel that this would increase 
“White Finn” influence on the Karelian population, extremely dangerous 
in a situation where the Karelians were only partly supportive of the Bol-
sheviks. The decision would also have a negative influence on the labour 
movement in Finland and Scandinavia. Karelians and Scandinavian work-
ers had been told that the Commune had saved natural resources from the 
117  Anna Laakkonen, “Suomeen on Karjala sidottu, mutta ei lahtari-Suomeen...”: 
viholliskuvan ja identiteetin rakentaminen Neuvosto-Karjalan suomalaisessa 
sanomalehdistössä 1920–1929, Master’s thesis, Department of History and Geography 
(Joensuu: University of Eastern Finland, 2010), 35.
118  Edvard Gylling, “Karjalan tehtävästä vallankumouksen etuvartiona” (On the task 
of Karelia as an advance guard of the revolution), Punainen Karjala 5.7.1924. Quoted 
in Laakkonen, “Suomeen on Karjala sidottu,” 35, my translation.
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capitalist plans of conquest. A policy of concessions would reduce all cred-
ibility. Gylling reported that a Norwegian engineer was currently planning 
a reorganization of the Karelian timber industry, and asked for permission 
and means to recruit experts from Finland and Scandinavia directly.121
Red Karelianism or Red Scandinavianism?
After the October Revolution, many Western visitors to the border between 
Finland and Soviet Russia waxed lyrical about its gloomy mystique, essen-
tially dividing two “worlds.”122 In contrast, the leader of a teachers’ seminar 
for Finns in Karelia described the land as a bridge connecting and uniting 
“the workers’ Finland of the future to the Union of Soviet Republics.” Since 
the working class in Finland was on a higher state of development “in the 
sense of working-class education,” they would play a key role, unlike the 
Karelian people “hidden away in the wilderness.”123 Nothing in the Soviet 
Karelian newspaper articles revealed the fact that the Finns constituted 
merely a minority among the inhabitants of the area.124 
The cultural policies of the Finnish leaders in East Karelia could be 
characterized as culturally imperialist on a local scale. The Finnish lan-
guage was imposed on the Karelians as a language of civilization. On the 
other hand, Gylling emphasized the interrelations of Finns and Karelians 
in the tradition of national romantic “cultural Karelianism.” The “tribal” 
brotherhood was extended to Scandinavia to include the historical friend-
ship and understanding between Scandinavian countries.125 The first step 
towards Scandinavia went via Finnish culture, and the assimilation of Kare-
lians into Finnish culture was a frequent cause for debate in the editorials 
in the newspapers of the Labour Commune of Karelia, for example, the 
question of the Finnicization of surnames.126 To the journal Kommunisti, 
Gylling explained that Finland’s historical duty was to aid the economic 
and cultural development of less developed “tribal brothers,” including not 
only Karelians but more distant Finno-Ugric minorities. An unpublished 
121  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 93–94. Kangaspuro refers to a “H. 
Langstedt,” probably Håvard Langseth, a Norwegian engineer and Labour Party (later 
Communist) politician, who visited the Karelian Labour Commune in 1921, as reported by 
Anonymous, “Neuvosto-Karjalan taloudellinen tulevaisuus,” Vapaus, 16 February 1921.
122  Engman, Gränsfall, 97–99.
123  Laakkonen, “Suomeen on Karjala sidottu,” 36, 77.
124  Ibid., 84.
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version of the article contained even more blatant proposals of a Greater 
Red Finland.127 The Finnish-language Soviet Karelian newspapers also 
described its historical task to defend the border as infinitely important, 
and this justified its very existence. Historian Anna Laakkonen finds that 
“practically the same arguments” were used to motivate hatred against 
Russians in 1920s Finland.128 
Gylling’s vision for Karelia’s future was orientated toward the North. 
Already in the negotiations between the Finnish People’s Delegation and 
Soviet Russia, he had insisted on including Petsamo and the route the Arctic 
Sea in his Greater Finland, following Voionmaa’s example. In 1917, Voion-
maa had as senator in charge of communications commissioned a report 
promoting Finland’s access to the Arctic Sea. Voionmaa began to write 
his definitive work on the Petsamo question, Suomi Jäämerellä (Finland 
at the Arctic Sea), in January 1918, as a parliamentary planning commit-
tee convened to discuss border claims. The tensions escalating towards a 
civil war in late January interrupted the committee’s work, but the People’s 
Delegation resumed it. Some of its members (e.g. Gylling and Otto Wille 
Kuusinen) had already participated in the previous committee. During 
the negotiations in Tartu 1920, suspicions were voiced that Voionmaa had 
personally assisted the People’s Delegation in the planning of the proposed 
border treaty and its maps. This contribution arguably enabled Finland to 
continue justifying its territorial demands.129
Baron identifies the Karelian double peripherality as directed towards 
the Soviet Russian centre and a future Scandinavian socialist centre in “the 
west.”130 The general use of “west” in this context seems misleading. Gyl-
ling envisioned “the West” as the target of Soviet Scandinavia’s economic 
power. I would prefer to describe Gylling’s geopolitical orientation as “Nor-
dic.” In the nationalist ideology of independent Finland, the country’s great 
historical task was to be a bulwark of the West against Soviet Russia.131 The 
“Fennoscandian shield,” rising against the eastern plains provided a strik-
ing geological metaphor.132 However, Finland’s northern position and its 
access to the Arctic distinguished it from Western Europe. Gylling defined 
127  Ibid., 146–147.
128  Laakkonen, “Suomeen on Karjala sidottu,” 34.
129  Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 127–133.
130  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 241.
131  Oula Silvennoinen, “Kumpujen yöhön – eli kuinka historiallinen muisti vääristyi,” 
Luvattu maa – Suur-Suomen unelma ja unohdus, ed. by Jenni Kirves and Sari Näre 
(Helsinki: Johnny Kniga – WSOY, 2014), 24–25.
132  Raivo, “Karjalan kasvot,” 22, 26.
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the purpose of Karelia’s nationality policy as paving the way for collabora-
tion between the Nordic peoples in a future socialist Soviet republic, but 
also the utilization of specifically Nordic resources and industries in the 
region of the Cap of the North. The conquest of the “New Soviet North” 
was an equivalent idea from the Soviet Russian perspective.133
Arguably, Karelia had a much stronger mythological value in nation-
alist thinking in the Republic of Finland than Petsamo and the Arctic. 
The former represented the nation’s golden age in addition to its natural 
wealth; the latter was merely a wilderness to be civilized and exploited 
– often disregarding the interests of its native inhabitants. Both of these 
exoticizing tropes of colonialism were important elements in the construc-
tion of a Finnish national identity. The double function of national myths 
about Karelia, promising both the wisdom of the past and the wealth of 
the future via the timber industry, reveal the double-edged sword of the 
auto-exotism or self-Othering by an intellectual elite, identifying with a 
“people” yet conscious of its position apart – the people in the present are 
subjected to the potential people of the past and the future, which only the 
elite can identify.134 The Red Finns in Soviet Karelia could not romanticize 
the bourgeois Finland that they had left behind, but even for them, Kare-
lia was merely a stepping-stone on the path of a greater future project. In 
Soviet Karelia, they would redeem the chance that they had lost in 1918.
In the early 1920s, Finnish-language papers published in Soviet Karelia 
depicted the area as a part of a Socialist Greater Finland and Scandinavia. 
Karelia would serve as a pivot for the revolution in Finland. This was illus-
trated with the nineteenth-century national romantic idea of Karelia as the 
birthplace of Finnish culture. Mythical Karelia belonged to no-one else but 
Finland. On the other hand, Red Finns felt allegiance to the Soviet state 
and the greater family of Soviet peoples. The Central Committee guaran-
teed the privileges of the Commune and its peculiar nationality policy.135
The Red Battalion of the North strikes back 
The Civil War of 1918 had disappointed both the victorious and the van-
quished sides in the struggle. The wounded nation could only be invigorated 
133  Baron, Soviet Karelia, 76.
134  Tepora, “Heimoveljiä, valkobandiitteja,” 71–72. For auto-exotism, cf. Elmgren, Den 
allrakäraste fienden, 166–168; for self-Othering, cf. Silvana Patriarca, “Indolence and 
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through reconnecting with its primordial roots in Karelia. While Commu-
nists were planning to light the spark of a Scandinavian revolution, some 
White activists were determined to do their part to crush Soviet power in 
the same spot. The first incursion of heimosoturit ( “tribal warriors,” in 
solidarity with the Finno-Ugric “brother nations” in the east) in Olonets 
1919 was not enthusiastically received by the local population. After sign-
ing the Treaty of Tartu, the Finnish government was obliged to stop such 
volunteers from crossing the eastern border. In exchange for Petsamo, Fin-
land had agreed to allow Soviet Russia to occupy the municipalities Repola 
and Porajärvi at the eastern border. A local uprising in East Karelia with 
the support of Finnish volunteers broke out in the autumn of 1921, and in 
December Repola, Porajärvi, and large parts of White Sea Karelia and Olo-
nets were under the control of the rebels.136 
The East Karelian revolt was framed as a struggle for independence, 
but it had in the eyes of its supporters only one self-evident outcome: the 
unification of East Karelia with Finland.137 Opinion in Finland was divided 
and the revolt was not supported unconditionally. Even a staunch anti-
Communist such as Esko Riekki, chief of the Detective Central Police in 
Tornio, wrote that the financial support to the Karelian uprising came from 
Finnish timber companies that were actually preparing the ground for rad-
icalization in Finland by exploiting their own workers.138 However, some 
elements of the right wanted an escalation. As the Minister of the Interior, 
Heikki Ritavuori of the liberal National Progressive Party, attempted to 
curb the border traffic, he was murdered in the street outside of his own 
home in 14 February 1922. The investigation of the murderer’s political 
connections was never completed.139
In the autumn of 1921, there had been only 700 Soviet troops in East 
Karelia. As the rebels took control of the region and defeated the ill-pre-
pared defenders, the People’s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, 
Leon Trotsky, issued a command to “liquidate the white Karelian bandits.”140 
136  Saarela 1996, Suomalaisen kommunismin synty, 249. Ylärakkola, Edvard Gylling, 150.
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The First Party Secretary of Karelia, Vasily Kudzhiev, took the opportu-
nity to criticize the autonomy policy severely. Kudzhiev pointed out that 
the purpose of the Commune was to advance a revolution in Finland and 
Scandinavia. Nothing had come of it, and the revolt proved that the Com-
mune had no future as autonomous region. Kudzhiev’s opinion represented 
the Left Opposition’s line in the question of the right of self-determination 
for minority nations in the All-Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) at 
that time.141 However, the Finns managed to defend their position and the 
ethnic Karelian Kudzhiev was replaced as party secretary with an emigré 
Red Finn in 1922.142
The Petrograd International Military School mobilized its Finnish and 
Karelian students, including former “Red jägers,” to form a volunteer ski 
battalion.143 The battalion’s leader was the young but experienced fighter 
Toivo Antikainen.144 This special force managed to turn the tide of the con-
flict in a few weeks. Stories about its battles became a recurring feature of 
Soviet Karelian memory culture.145 Another campaign, which was being 
prepared simultaneously, was to be less celebrated. In January–February 
1922, the military wing of the Communist Party of Finland dusted off the 
Nordic War Plan in the hopes of kindling a revolt in Northern Finland 
with the support of the Bolsheviks.146 However, the execution of the plan 
leaves doubts about the full extent of the support. 
In early February 1922, a small ski patrol consisting of around 70 men, 
led by the Red Army Commissar “Jahvetti Moilanen” (a nom de guerre), 
crossed the border and entered Finnish territory in the area of Kuolajärvi 
and Savukoski.147 On 2 February, they approached the lumber workers in the 
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forestry company Kemi Oy’s work camp in Värriö and attempted to incite 
them to join a “Red Guerrilla Battalion of the North.”148 This campaign 
later acquired the derisive name “pork revolt” (läskikapina), as Moilanen 
reputedly held a rousing speech standing on top of a food crate.149 The “pork 
revolt” took timber companies and border guards by complete surprise. 
The battalion, with newly recruited members, withdrew to the Soviet side 
of the border on 7 February.150
Nationalist historiography depicted the “pork revolt” as a punitive 
expedition of the Communist Party of Finland as a retaliation for the East 
Karelian uprising.151 Researchers leaned towards this interpretation.152 How-
ever, Soviet sources hint at bigger plans. In early 1921, the Comintern had 
advised Communist parties around the world to take more effective action 
for world revolution. The Communist Party of Finland had reserved a con-
siderable sum for “expected struggles in the lumber forests of Lapland.”153 
According to Moilanen’s own memoirs, he had been selected at Petrograd 
International Military School for a “certain top secret task” in 1922.154 
Moilanen’s notes imply that the expedition was unable to accomplish the 
planned task, although its nature remained unclear. Not until 1937 did he 
specify that “it was decided that if we accomplish a broader revolt in North-
ern Finland, the battle will be continued on Finnish soil, but if we fail, we 
move on to Soviet Karelia and continue the struggle for workers’ power 
there.”155 Years later, anti-Communist writers did not hesitate to draw their 
conclusions about the true purpose of the Red Guerrilla Battalion of the 
North – full-scale Scandinavian revolution, not merely local retaliation.156 
In the summer of 1922, the Detective Central Police managed to discover 
the connection point in Tornio that the northern Communists had been 
industry and escaped imprisonment by the Whites to Soviet Russia in 1918. In Soviet 
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using to communicate and to supply comrades with materials and money.157 
Another blow to Communist activities was struck in the summer of 1923 
when Finnish authorities suspected that another “pork revolt” was being 
prepared. Finland’s Socialist Labour Party, hitherto functioning legally, was 
prohibited, and hundreds of its members were arrested. Finnish authorities 
also followed the considerably more open activities of the Swedish Com-
munists in the 1920s, looking for evidence of Scandinavian Red Guards.158
The decline of the “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia”
Thanks to Gylling’s persuasive skills, Soviet Karelia initially enjoyed special 
status and autonomy in its nationalities policy and in economic administra-
tion. The borders of the Karelian Labour Commune in 1920 corresponded 
with Gylling’s ideas of economic realism and national idealism. In the mid-
1920s, the region expanded to include Russian-majority areas. Gylling saw 
this as a temporary setback to the balance between the nationalities in the 
region, but a small price to pay for a greater future gain in the form of a 
Scandinavian Soviet Republic.159 In this sense, Gylling’s “Red Scandina-
vianism” was closer to the geopolitical views of Väinö Voionmaa’s inspi-
ration, Rudolf Kjellén, who argued that expansionism was a natural and 
necessary way of self-preservation for the state.160
During the first years of the Karelian Labour Commune, its newspapers 
had depicted the region as a bulwark of Soviet power against bourgeois 
Finland and the capitalist world, with the task to spread revolution to the 
west.161 In the second half of the 1920s, Soviet Russian leaders paid more 
attention to the control of border regions. No longer was Karelia seen as 
a potential gateway for revolutionary expeditions, but as an increasingly 
vulnerable target to enemy attacks.162 The idea of a Scandinavian revolution 
was abandoned. The region was now expected to protect peace and stabili-
ty.163 Starting in 1928, enforced collectivization was a blow to its economic 
autonomy, subjecting the farming production completely to the needs of 
the timber industry.164 Ever-growing labour camps provided the industry 
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with cheap workforce.165 Gylling’s plan to use economical power lived on: 
in 1930, Soviet representatives hoped to “force Finland into total economic 
dependence” by timber exports, among others.166
A final rhetorical resurrection of the Scandinavian revolution was wit-
nessed in the late 1920s and the early 1930s, as Soviet Karelia started to 
receive an influx of immigrants from Finland and North America. Thou-
sands of Finns, Finnish-Americans and Finnish-Canadians were willing 
to bet on Soviet prosperity at the onset of the Great Depression.167 Kustaa 
Rovio, first secretary of the regional committee of the All-Russian Com-
munist Party (bolsheviks) in Karelia, convinced Stalin to order the Joint 
State Political Directorate (OGPU) and Narkomindel to accept the immi-
grants. He argued that immigration would help Karelia to develop into 
a “truly exemplary socialist republic, which would revolutionize by its 
example also the neighbouring countries, Finland and the other Scandi-
navian countries.”168 As continued centralization policies tore down Kare-
lian autonomy, the persuasive power of the “stepping-stone” argument was 
weakened. In his struggles against centralization in the early 1930s, Gyl-
ling stubbornly appealed to Karelia’s special rights as a “forepost of Soviet 
power in the North” or “forepost in the Soviet north-west” as guaranteed 
by Lenin.169 The OGPU increasingly suspected the Finns to be agents of 
“bourgeois nationalism.”170 The Red Finns did not hesitate to use the early 
phase of the purges for their own purposes, targeting ethnic Karelian offi-
cials who opposed their nationality policy.171 When Andrei Zhdanov used 
his position as First Secretary of the Leningrad Obkom to investigate local 
conditions in Soviet Karelia, he accused the Red Finns of selfishly aspiring 
for leadership positions in a future Soviet Finland.172 Scandinavia was not 
mentioned. Gylling and Rovio were released from their duties in 1935.173
The Great Terror escalated in 1937–38. Within one year, the NKVD 
arrested almost 10,000 people, one third of whom were Finns – out of 
2.5 per cent of the total population. Over 83 per cent of the arrested were 
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sentenced to death.174 Gylling was arrested in Moscow on 25 July 1937, and 
expelled from the Communist Party of Finland in September.175 NKVD 
chief of Karelia, Karl Tenison, composed a conspiracy theory of the various 
international connections of Gylling’s Finnish nationalists, inversing the 
“stepping-stone” argument into a threat against the Soviet Union, only 
twenty days before his own dismissal and a few months before his death 
following an “interrogation.”176
Undoubtedly, Rovio and Gylling were working on behalf of a “Finniciza-
tion” of Karelia. Initially, they had the full support of the Bolshevik nation-
ality policy.177 As late as 1928, Gylling celebrated the “first treaty between 
Socialist republics,” namely the 1918 agreement between the Finnish Peo-
ple’s Delegation and Soviet Russia, which allowed the border between the 
two countries to follow national lines.178 This nationalist self-confidence 
was noted in right-wing circles in Finland. Urho Kekkonen, later Presi-
dent of the Republic, published a tongue-in-cheek column in the student 
magazine Ylioppilaslehti, where he as a future dictator of Finland declared 
a state alliance with the Soviet Republic of Karelia and cultivated a per-
sonal friendship with Gylling.179 Only three years earlier, Gylling had been 
deemed such a sensitive subject for the Finnish public that the Finnish 
translation of popular Swedish cartoonist Albert Engström’s travel report 
from Soviet Russia had left out a cartoon and a paragraph describing the 
man “with an utterly rare career behind him.”180 
Moscow had supported Red Finnish nationalism, as well as the Scandi-
navian plan, but by the mid-1930s, the past was irrelevant – except as a polit-
ical weapon.181 There were no longer any nuances between bourgeois and 
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working-class nationalism. Since Finland was a bourgeois state, all Finn-
ish nationalism was bourgeois. Since Russia was a socialist state, Russian 
nationalism equalled Soviet patriotism.182 The connection to Finland was 
used by Soviet authorities as proof of “bourgeois nationalism” among other 
Finno-Ugric minorities in Russia.183 Although Karelians were also targeted 
in the persecutions, some policy changes were introduced in favour of the 
Karelian language after Rovio and Gylling were ousted in 1935.184 
Changes within the Comintern also revealed a turn against interna-
tional “Red Scandinavianism” in the mid- to late 1920s. As Communist 
parties started to develop their activities in other parts of Europe, the Com-
intern no longer supported the special position of the Scandinavian Com-
mittee in Stockholm.185 Its activities waned, although the pro-Comintern 
parties of the Nordic countries continued to hold Nordic meetings in 1922 
and 1924. In the 1924 meeting, the argument for Nordic cooperation was 
a defensive one: as the Nordic employers’ organizations were establishing 
closer contacts, the Nordic workers should form a united front. However, 
this “Scandinavian federation” was soon de facto disbanded. In late 1927, a 
Scandinavian regional secretariat was founded in Moscow and adopted the 
Moscow-centred perspective of the increasingly centralized Comintern: it 
dealt with each country as a separate case, and it did not include Finland.186 
In the 1920s, Finnish Communists were often appointed to instruct 
Scandinavians, and many Finns nourished a superior self-image as trail-
blazers of the revolution after the experiences of 1918. The regional secre-
tariats were suppressed in 1935, and the leaders responsible for activities in 
Scandinavian countries were generally nominated from other European 
regions towards the end of the 1930s. There were many possible reasons to 
separate Finland from Scandinavia, including Soviet Russian security pol-
icy, the economic and political similarities between Finland and the Baltic 
countries, and the fact that their Communist parties all had their leader-
ship residing in Moscow due to their illegality in their home countries.187 
Fenno-Scandinavian cooperation was thus not supported by the Com-
intern’s organizational structure. Another obstacle appeared in the form 
of ideological developments in the Nordic countries themselves. In the 
182  Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 309, 333.
183  Walter Kolarz, Russia and her colonies (London: George Philip and Son Ltd, 1953), 54. 
184  Tepora, “Heimoveljiä, valkobandiitteja,” 122; Kangaspuro, Neuvosto-Karjalan taistelu, 
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mid-1930s, the Social Democratic parties in the Nordic countries, par-
ticularly Finland and Sweden, introduced a new concept evoking Nordic 
cooperation: “Nordic Democracy.”188 This could be described as a way of co-
opting bourgeois nationalism against the rising tide of Fascism in Europe. 
In December 1935, the centre-right government of Finland also adopted a 
“Scandinavian orientation” as foreign policy.189 These Social Democrat and 
Liberal uses of the Nordic region, however loosely defined, did not inspire 
adaptation by the Comintern. Conservative and radical nationalists in Fin-
land nevertheless saw a pacifist or even Marxist threat in the leftist-liberal 
Scandinavian or Nordic orientation in their own countries.190
Echoes of the “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia”
Many Red Finns lost their lives in uncertain circumstances in the Great 
Terror. Many confessed to crimes they had never committed, and many 
died without knowing what they had been condemned of. One of these 
countless victims was the officer who had led the “Red Guerrilla Battal-
ion of the North” as “Jahvetti Moilanen”; he was accused of “counter-rev-
olutionary activities” in the same “gang” as Gylling, Rovio and others.191 
The diverging fates of the Red jägers is a case study in the arbitrariness of 
the persecutions.192 
After the mass murders, any mention of a “Soviet Republic of Scandina-
via” seems to have disappeared from the publications of Finnish Commu-
nists. Otto Wille Kuusinen, a member of the Finnish People’s Delegation in 
1918 who gained a high position in the Comintern, reputedly dreamed of 
becoming “Proconsul of Scandinavia,” but this seems to have been noth-
ing but a vengeful boast.193 During the Winter War 1939–40, Kuusinen was 
appointed to lead a Soviet puppet government, supposedly representing 
a revolutionary uprising in Finland, which was to be united with Soviet 
Karelia in exchange for complying with territorial demands.194 Accord-
188  Kurunmäki, “‘Nordic Democracy’ in 1935,” 37, 42–43.
189  Ibid.,52–53.
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ing to Soviet propaganda, it was not at war with Finland but helped the 
Kuusinen government to defeat “White bandits” – a reference to the unrest 
in Karelia in the 1920s.195 
The spectre of Gylling’s great plan haunted the anti-Soviet propaganda of 
the war years. To justify Finland’s participation in the Barbarossa offensive 
in the summer of 1941, the so-called “Continuation War,” the plan’s out-
lines appeared in articles and books revealing Soviet espionage. A widely 
circulated article after the conquest of Petrozavodsk in 15 July 1941 claimed 
that the Soviet Union had purposefully constructed East Karelia as a huge 
military base, intending to use it as a stepping-stone towards the conquest 
of Finland and entire Scandinavia. By occupying the region, Finland would 
do a great service to the Nordic countries and Europe.196
In his 1942 bestseller on “Finland’s struggle against Soviet espionage,” 
Swedish-speaking poet and journalist Örnulf Tigerstedt resurrected the 
Stockholm spy trials of 1921.197 Tigerstedt favoured a form of Scandinavian 
unity – the “Old Realm,” Sweden and Finland united as one kingdom. He 
hoped that Hitler’s Germany would help recreate this unity by rekindling 
old values of national idealism and ending Swedish neutrality.198 Tiger-
stedt’s descriptions of Communist spy cases were detailed and based on 
police resources, and his colourful prose provided the necessary indignant 
context. Explaining the relevance of the Nordic War Plan, he stated that 
it should never have been hidden away in the archives: “[It] ought to have 
been printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, and, framed behind glass, 
hung visibly in every school hall in the Nordic countries, and especially 
on the walls of those people, who stubbornly in their simple faith trusted 
that the Bolshevik state’s intentions towards the surrounding world were 
as pious as a lamb’s. Perhaps many a thing would have been different in 
the Nordic countries when the decisive crisis broke out 20 years later.”199
Tigerstedt aimed to convince the Scandinavian neighbours, two of 
which were under German occupation, that Finland was fighting for their 
common interest. To him, the 1921 Stockholm spy trials and the 1922 “pork 
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revolt” were closely connected cases. The exiled Red Finns conspiring in 
Sweden and the raid on the timber camps were “nothing but the begin-
ning and end of the same plan”: to “Bolshevize the Nordic countries.”200 
Tigerstedt described the alleged club pin of the veterans of the Murmansk 
legion who left British service to join the border guards of Soviet Karelia: 
decorated with red enamel, it showed a map of Finland between North 
Russia and North Sweden, with an arm stretching over it from the east 
and grabbing the hand of another, shackled arm, reaching from the west. 
“This sign, too, leads the thoughts to Gylling’s memorandum [the Nordic 
War Plan] and the Swedish Battalion of the Finnish Red Guards’ dealings 
in Sweden,” Tigerstedt reminded the readers. Still, he could not – or would 
not – explain why the Reds in the North decided to abandon the plan of a 
“Scandinavian Soviet Republic.”201
Although Tigerstedt mocked the pompous declarations of the Com-
munist leaders that lead to “a few weapons exercises, a hasty courier action 
and a lot of speeches to a handful of lumberjacks,” he speculated that if the 
timing of the “pork revolt” had been better, it would have shown the world 
“what a dreadful danger had actually loomed over Northern Scandinavia.” 
If the Red central command in Stockholm had been able to launch an attack 
across the border, and if the Reds of the Tornio river valley, Rovaniemi, 
Oulu and Kajaani, together with the Reds of Swedish Norrland, had man-
aged to unite in a common front with the victorious Bolsheviks in East 
Karelia, “we do not know how the fate of the Nordic countries would have 
turned out.”202 Tigerstedt’s scenario seems far-fetched. In February 1922, 
there was no Red Battalion in Sweden, because many of its former lead-
ers had already travelled to Soviet Russia. Despite the ifs and buts, a sober 
conclusion would not have captivated the reader’s imagination.
The story of the “Scandinavian Soviet Republic” briefly reappeared in 
Finland before the Finnish-Soviet cease-fire in September 1944, via the 
Norwegian pro-Quisling newspaper Aftenposten, which had unearthed 
documents related to the Stockholm spy trials in 1921. Ajan Suunta, the 
organ of a pro-Fascist party in Finland, published the Aftenposten findings 
on 14 June 1944, as Finland had initiated armistice negotiations with the 
Soviet Union. The stories were entitled “Scandinavian Soviet Republic: Red 
Imperialism Does Not Abandon Its Demands Even in the North-West,” 
200  Tigerstedt, Vastavakoilu iskee, 49.
201  Ibid., 56–57.
202  Ibid., 60.
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and “New Proof of the Aims of Bolshevist Imperialism.”203 Evidently, the 
goal was to keep Finland fighting by Germany’s side, but the newspaper 
was soon prohibited along with other “Fascist” publications to comply with 
the armistice demands of the Soviet Union.
Tigerstedt’s involvement in pro-German propaganda caused not just 
a career setback but a personal disaster when cease-fire was proclaimed 
between Finland and the Soviet Union on 4 September 1944.204 With his 
wife, he left Finland illegally in a small motorboat and arrived in Sweden 
on 30 September 1944. A press campaign was launched against him in Swe-
den, and the authorities interned him in a prison camp. Even then, Tiger-
stedt could not understand the Swedish public’s indignant reaction to the 
German occupation of Denmark and Norway.205
 “International in form, national in content” – Red Scandinavism 
as vision and reality 
In 1935, as the Red Finnish leaders were being expelled from their posi-
tions, Soviet Karelian achievements were advertised to Finnish-American 
Communists in a publication celebrating “Soviet Karelia’s Journey of 15 
Years.” Nothing in this publication hinted at any Scandinavian connec-
tion. The increasingly questioned nationality policies were still officially 
sanctioned with Stalin’s (originally Lenin’s) slogan: “National in form, 
socialist in content.”206 An inverted version of this slogan would have fit-
ted Edvard Gylling’s Red Scandinavism: “Regionalist in form, national-
ist in content.” As a historical stage, the imagined Nordic community of 
revolutionary Karelia, Finland, Sweden, and Norway – Denmark and Ice-
land remained peripheral – could have been justified as a more progres-
sive developmental phase than parochial Karelian or Finnish nationalism. 
A “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia” needed Karelia as urgently as 
the nationalist Greater Finland needed it, at least from the point of view of 
its own promotors. Eventually, both plans had to be abandoned, because 
the great external power necessary to realize them did not materialize. The 
foundation of a “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia” was not the pri-
203  “Skandinavian neuvostotasavalta,” “Bolshevistisen imperialismin tavoitteista uusia 
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mary or even secondary reason for the founding of the Karelian Labour 
Commune, and much less the reason for the demise of its leaders – Finn-
ish nationalism was damnable enough. 
As a curious footnote, the idea of a “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scan-
dinavia” was utilized again for political purposes in some anti-Soviet pub-
lications in Finland during the “Continuation War” in 1941–44. One might 
ask why these publications took the vague hints and the unrealistic scope 
of the Nordic War Plan and other documents of the early 1920s spy cases 
so seriously, when the recent experience of the Winter War could pro-
vide fresh arguments for a war of retaliation. A reason could be that in a 
worldview where the enemy had to represent absolute evil, every action of 
this enemy was not merely an act of expansionist geopolitics; it was a por-
tent of the final apocalyptic struggle for existence, which was now being 
fought. National Socialism was primarily concerned with race, secondarily 
with space, in its genocidal war in Eastern Europe.207 Tigerstedt mirrored 
Nazi ideas about racial corruption, but also Spenglerian fatalism, when he 
claimed that the Soviet Union would destroy the “innermost substance” of 
the Finnish nation “in a system of annihilation without parallel in world 
history” when Finland agreed to sue for peace separately in 1944.208
The influence of Väinö Voionmaa and even Rudolf Kjellén can be traced 
in the geopolitical plans and proposals of the Finnish revolutionaries, par-
ticularly Edvard Gylling, in the negotiations that led to the foundation of 
an autonomous Soviet Karelia. The plans of the Red Finns paradoxically 
utilized a conservative, expansionist and nationalist geopolitical concept to 
make national autonomy for Soviet Karelia more palatable to the leadership 
of world revolution in Moscow and Petrograd. Because of the originally 
Fenno-centric perspective, this concept marginalized the Karelian popu-
lation. However, the vision of a “Socialist Soviet Republic of Scandinavia” 
did not mention what role the Finns would play among other developed 
Nordic nationalities. Perhaps the Red Finns assumed that they would be 
able to keep a leading role in Red Scandinavia, thanks to their experiences 
in 1918, as they attempted to do in the Comintern’s Scandinavian organi-
zations before the 1930s.
To paraphrase the Soviet slogan, Red Scandinavianism was interna-
tionalist in form, nationalist in content – if one by nationalism means the 
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promotion of Karelian autonomy and Finnicization policies; it was not in 
contradiction to early 1920s Soviet policies regarding minority nations. 
The Scandinavian and Nordic orientation served this purpose initially, 
because – as in the case of the Social Democrat concept of Nordic Democ-
racy in the 1930s – the Nordic perspective was no contradiction, but rather 
a complement, to national policies.
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Kokkuvõte: Skandinaavia Nõukogude Sotsialistlik Vabariik
Oktoobrirevolutsioonile järgnenud aastakümnel rakendasid Rootsis, Soo-
mes ja Nõukogude Karjalas eksiilis viibinud Soome revolutsioonilised 
poliitikud oma rahvuslikud ja regionalistlikud geopoliitilised ideed kom-
munistliku maailmarevolutsiooni teenistusse. Ideed revolutsioonilise 
“Skandinaavia” ühendamisest Soome ja Karjalaga võib näha laialt levi-
nud nn Suur-Soome projekti laiendusena.
Sotsiaaldemokraatlik riigimees ja geopoliitika teadlane Väino Voionmaa 
mõjutas 1918. aasta alguskuudel lühikese elueaga Soome revolutsioonilist 
valitsust (Suomen kansanvaltuuskunta) esitama territoriaalseid nõudmisi 
Nõukogude Venemaa vastu. Voionmaa mõju võib näha ka läbirääkimis-
tes, mis viisid autonoomse Nõukogude Karjala loomiseni.
1918. aasta läbikukkumine sundis punasoomlaste liidreid oma rolli 
paguluses ümbermõtestama. Mõjutatuna kontaktidest Rootsi ja Norra radi-
kaalsotsialistidega loodi ambitsioonikaid plaane, mis ressursside nappuse 
tõttu kunagi ei teostunud. 1918. aasta lõpul loodi Stockholmis “Skandinaa-
via Revolutsiooniline Komitee”, millelt pärines projekt “Soome punakaardi 
Rootsi pataljoni” loomiseks ning suurejooneline “Põhjamaine sõjaplaan”: 
kava “Skandinaavia Punaarmee” revolutsiooniliseks sõjakäiguks. Neid 
dokumente kasutati tõestusmaterjalina sensatsioonilises kohtuprotsessis 
Soome ja Rootsi kommunistide vastu 1921. aastal Stockholmis.
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Edvard Gyllingi, endise Soome punavalitsuse rahvasaadiku mõte oli 
ka autonoomse Karjala Töökommuuni loomine Nõukogude Venemaal. 
Gylling veenis Leninit nõustuma Karjala omavalitsusega, väites, et sellest 
saaks lähtekoht revolutsioonile Soomes ja Skandinaavias. Lõpuks pidi Kar-
jala muutuma osaks suuremast Skandinaavia Nõukogude Sotsialistlikust 
Vabariigist, mida ühendanuks kultuurilised, geograafilised ja majandus-
likud faktorid. See “punane Skandinaavia” pidi monopoliseerima puidu-
kaubanduse ning haarama majandusliku võimu Lääne-Euroopa üle.
Karjala Töökommuun loodi karjalastega asustatud aladel Olonetsis ja 
Arhangelskis 1921. aastal. Gylling nimetati Rahvakomissaride Nõukogu 
esimeheks. Rõhutud rahvastele rahvusliku enesemääramise õigust luba-
des lootsis bolševikud käima lükata ajaloolist protsessi, mis kulmineeruks 
klassisõjas ja proletaarses revolutsioonis.
 “Arenenud” rahvad pidid seejuures näitama eeskuju “vähemarene-
nutele”. Soomlaste ja karjalaste hõimuvendlust laiendati hõlmamaks ka 
Skandinaavia rahvaid. Seejuures piirdusid tegelikud transnatsionaalsed 
revolutsioonilised aktsioonid vaid üksikute ekspeditsioonidega üle piiri, 
nagu nn Pekimäss (Läskikapina) 1922. aastal
Skandinaavia revolutsiooni idee jäeti sinnapaika 1920. aastate kes-
kel, nagu ka maailmarevolutsiooni oma. Sundkollektiviseerimine Karja-
las allutas põllumajanduse metsatööstuse huvidele ning järjest paisuvad 
sunnitöölaagrid pakkusid odavat tööjõudu. Kuna Karjala liidrid jätkasid 
autonoomia kaitsmist, nägi OGPU neis “kodanliku natsionalismi” agente. 
Edvard Gylling koos paljude teistega eemaldati võimult 1935. ja tõenäoli-
selt hukati 1937. aastal. 
Viimaseid viiteid Nõukogude Skandinaaviale võib leida nõukogude-
vastasest propagandast, mis pidid õigustama Soome osalemist Barbarossa 
pealetungis 1941. aasta suvel. Selleks otsiti uuesti välja 1921. aastal Stock-
holmi kohtuprotsessil avalikkuse ette toodud “Põhjamaade sõjaplaan” kui 
tõend bolševike vallutusplaanidest Skandinaavias.
Edvard Gylling kasutas Skandinaaviat regionalistliku mõistena, et teha 
Nõukogude Karjala mõtet vastuvõetavaks maailmarevolutsiooni juhtkon-
nale Moskvas ja Petrogradis. Vaatamata multirahvuselise Skandinaavia 
idee potentsiaalsele laiahaardelisusele marginaliseeris fennotsentriline 
vaatenurk Karjala rahvastikku. Punane skandinavism oli vormilt inter-
natsionaalne, kuid sisult rahvuslik. See oli mõeldud pakkuma lohutust ja 
eesmärki paguluses viibivatele punasoomlastele ning võimalust neile taas-
vallutada Soomet Nõukogude Karjala piires.
